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Expropriation Risk Through Real Earnings Management on
Islamic Banking1
Surifah*

Cokroaminoto University of Yogyakarta
This study develops a model of expropriation through real earnings management (REM) in the
Indonesian Islamic banking industry. The purpose of this study is to test a new model by examining
the relationship between REM, bank ownership types, and performance of Islamic banks in Indonesia in the period of 2006 - 2013. This study finds that there are significant differences in REM and
performance scores in banks with different ownership types. The REM and performance scores for
family-owned banks and private-owned banks are relatively similar. However, Islamic banks with
government as the controlling shareholder have the highest REM scores and the lowest performance
scores. In contrast, foreign-owned banks have the lowest REM scores and the highest performance
scores. The indications of expropriation can be seen from the magnitude of REM. A high REM can
lower profitability and efficiency while increasing the risks faced by Islamic banks in Indonesia.
Keywords: Real earnings management, Islamic banking, performance

Introduction
Expropriation is the leveraging of power and
control by large shareholders to maximize their
welfare at the expense of minority shareholders
(Méndez, 2009). Expropriation or the taking of
private benefits can be done by using at least
three ways as follows: 1) through the company’s
operation policy, such as its compensation, pension financing and bonus policies, and by withholding dividends, 2) through freezing out; that
is, selling shares with a higher cash flow and
lower controlling rights than regular shares to
other companies, with cheaper price. 3) through
the company contract policy (tunneling), using
transfer prices, asset transfer from the company
to the controlling shareholders under cheaper
prices, and using the company’s assets to guarantee loans taken (Gilson & Gordon, 2003).
There are many indications of expropriation

by the controller-owners and/or management
in legal cases involving Indonesian banks. For
example, Bank Century’s case in 2008, Bank
Global’s in 2005, and Bank Summa in 1992.
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia (The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia) (2009) ruled Bank Century as a failed bank
in November 20th, 2008. Police data showed
that Bank Century suffered financial loss of IDR
1.18 trillion. The financial losses were traced to
have flowed to up to IDR 276.7 billion to Robert Tantular, up to IDR 248.44 billion to Anton
Tantular, and up to IDR 853.971 billion to Hartawan Alui. Hartawan Alui and Robert Tantular
were the sons-in-law of Sukanta Tanudjaja (Vivanews.com, 2008). The government liquidated Bank Summa in December 14th, 1992. Bank
Summa failed because it channeled most of its
credit to affiliated companies, which are apparently non-performing (Business Knowledges,
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2009). Bank Indonesia revoked the business
permit for Bank Global in January 13th, 2005.
Bank Global experienced capital adequacy issues because of fictitious credits and securities.
In the end, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of
Bank Global reached negative 39.11% (Tempo.
co, 2005). Evidences point out that the collapse
of several banks in the economic crisis of 19971998 is not only due to their weakness in utilizing best practice corporate governance, but also
because their channeled credit is concentrated
too highly to affiliated companies.
Expropriation can be hidden, either by using
earnings management or through discretionary accruals as well as real activities. Several
studies show that insiders covered the taking of
private benefits through accrual earnings management (Crocker & Slemrod, 2007). Earnings
management can also be done through various
real activities, such as using related transactions (Carlo, 2014), cutting research and development expenses (R&D), advertising and
maintenance, and delaying new projects (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005), through the
excessive goods production, discount, sale,
discretionary expenses, and administration
and general expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006),
through the related party transaction and excessive executives compensation (Saanoun, Riahi,
& Arab 2013), through tunneling transaction
(Luo, Wan, & Cai, 2012; La Porta, Lopez-desilanes, & Shleifer, 2000;
Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010), or through propping with an affiliated company (Jian & Wong, 2010).
The main purpose of this research is to develop an earnings management model based on
the real activities in Islamic Bank. The earnings
management model based on the real activities
in the conventional banks have been studied by
Surifah (2014), meanwhile an ERM for nonfinancial and non-bank companies have been
done many times in several previous studies
(Graham et al., 2005; Jian & Wong, 2010; Luo
et al., 2012; Roychowdhury, 2006; Saanoun et
al., 2013; Zang, 2012). The study of a real earnings management model for Islamic banks has
not received enough attention yet in the afore-

mentioned literature, yet Islamic banks have
particular characteristics that differentiate them
from conventional banks and non-bank industry. Therefore, this study will develop a real
earnings management model for Islamic Bank.
This study is relevant not only because inattention on modeling real earnings management
for Islamic banks in current literature, but also
because the managing earnings through real activities is a tool most often used to hide expropriation (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010; Graham
et al., 2005; Jian & Wong, 2010; Johnson, La
Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer, 2000; Kim
& Sohn, 2013; Luo et al., 2012; Roychowdhury,
2006; Saanoun et al., 2013). The development
of real earnings management model for Islamic
banks is the original contribution of this study.
This study will examine the new model of
Islamic bank’s real earnings management by
studying the relationships between the real
earnings management, types of bank controlling interest and company performance. Therefore, other purposes of this study is to provide
empirical evidence that: 1) Real earnings management in various banks differs with different
controlling interest. The difference reflects the
different expropriation level among the types of
ownership. 2) Bank performances differ among
different ownership types. Expropriation by the
controller shareholders finally will influence
the performance. Therefore, the performance
difference can reflect the expropriation level
(Achmad, Rusmin, Neilson, & Tower, 2009;
Surifah, 2014). 3) giving evidence that the real
earnings management influences the banks’
performance.

Literature Review
Earnings management is the accounting
policies or decisions set by the manager to influence the earnings figure to achieve certain
purposes (Scott, 2012). Earnings management
can be done by controlling various accrual accounts2, changing selected accounting policy
and real activities. Earnings management utilizes accounting policies such as the selection

Accrual is the income items and expense in the income statement that are not included in the statement of cash flow,such as
amortization expense,the increase of the receivable, the increase of inventory value and the decrease of debts (Scott, 2012).
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of a depreciation method, and discretionary accruals such as the amount set to cover guarantee
expenses, inventory valuation, determining the
particular time, and amount of extraordinary
and nonrecurring expense items to recognize.
Earnings management through real activities
such as advertisement expenses, research and
development, maintenance, the timing of fixed
assets purchase and sale (Scott, 2012). Earnings
management through manipulation of real activities is defined by Roychowdhury (2006) as
departures from normal operational practices,
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at
least some stakeholders into believing certain
financial reporting goals have been met in the
normal course of operations. These departures
do not necessarily contribute to firm value even
though they enable managers to meet reporting
goals.
Types of Controlling Owners and Earnings
Management
Previous studies have found that certain
types of controlling interests are related to earnings management. Control over the company
motivates the controlling shareholders to manage earnings (Haw, Hu, Huang, & Wu, 2011).
Companies held under the sway of controlling
shareholders tend to have a high misclassification level on their financial statements (Sanjaya,
2011). The controlling shareholders minimise
the accounting earnings to maintain the growth
potential in the future (Ding, Zhang, & Zhang,
2007). Several other studies found the negative
effects of different ownership types on earnings
management, especially the family-ownership
type. Companies controlled by a family is less
aggressive in managing earnings using discretionary accruals (Atmaja, Haman, & Tanewski,
2011; Jiraporn & Dadalt, 2009; Tong, 2008).
Companies with high percentage of family
ownership tends to choose efficient earnings
management (Siregar & Utama, 2008).
Based on the above studies, this study assumes that the various banks’ ownership types
will also determine the degree of earnings management practiced. The earnings management
in this study was measured with the real earn-
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ings management, therefore the first hypothesis (H1) in this study can be stated as follows:
“there is the difference of the real earnings
management among Islamic Banks with different types of controlling owners in Indonesia”.
Types of Controlling Owners and Bank
Performance
The previous studies found that the type of
controlling shareholders are related with the use
of earnings management (Atmaja et al., 2011;
Ding et al., 2007; Haw et al., 2011; Jiraporn &
Dadalt 2009; Sanjaya, 2011; Siregar & Utama,
2008; Tong 2008), meanwhile earnings management is often used as the tool to hide expropriation (Crocker & Slemrod, 2007; Graham et
al., 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Jian & Wong 2010;
Saanoun et al., 2013). Therefore it makes sense
if the controlling ownership type will influence
the degree of a company’s performance level.
This is supported by the finding of Achmad et
al. (2009) that the ownership type directly influenced the financial performance of Indonesian
companies in their data set. Thus, the second
hypothesis (H2) of this study can be stated as
follows:
H2: There is a difference in performance among
Islamic banks in Indonesia with differing
types of controlling ownership.
The Real Earnings Management and Bank
Performance
The management decision to manage earnings is due to both the encouragement of the
controlling shareholders and their own initiative, and can bring financial loss to the company as a consequence. Why is this so? This
is because: 1) earnings management can lead
to suboptimal investment decisions (McNichols & Stubben, 2008), 2) both the real earnings management and discretionary accruals
positively influence the cost of capital (Kim &
Sohn, 2012), 3) discretionary accruals that are
the proxy of earnings management negatively
influences company value (Abbas & Rizwan,
2007). Commercial banks managing their earnings face negative market response if they in-
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Table 1. The Sample Number of Banks Each Year
Note
Year
Sum of Banks (N)

Year
2006
3

2007
4

2008
6

2009
6

tentionally report decreased earnings during
good periods and report increased earnings during bad periods (Abbas & Rizwan, 2007).
Based on these studies, this means that the
earnings management can negatively influence
the company performance. This study therefore
assumes that real earnings manement has a negative effect on performance. The performance
in the study is measured using three proxies in
three dimensions. The three proxies used are
profitability, efficiency, and risk level. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is specified as follows:
H3.a: Real earnings management has a negative
effect on profitability.
H3.b: Real earnings management has a negative
effect on efficiency.
H3.c: Real earnings management has a positive
effect on risk level.

Data and Methodology
Data
The data used in this study is of Indonesian
Islamic Banks from 2006 to 2013. We use secondary data such as financial statements and
financial ratios from the Indonesian Banking
Directory (Bank Indonesia, 2006-2013). The
number of Islamic Banks of Indonesia were
not many, so this study’s population relatively
small. Sample is taken for the study using purposive sampling, with the requirement that the
financial statement is included in Indonesian
Banking Directory (IBD). There are 11 Islamic
Banks in 2013; however, only 9 banks are used
in our sample because the financial statements
of the other two banks are not included in IBD.
Finally, we acquire 61 observed banks in the
sample period of 8 years. Table 1 shows the
number of banks observed each year.
Operational Definition
Measurement

and

Variable

The study variables consist of bank perhttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/2
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v7i2.5137

Sum of Observation
2010
11

2011
11

2012
11

2013
3

61

formance, types of controlling owners, REM,
ownership concentration, and size of bank. Performance is seen from 3 dimensions, and these
are profitability, efficiency and risk level. Profitability is measured by return on asset (ROA),
return on equity (ROE), and net interest margin (NIM). Profitability represents the Islamic
Bank’s ability in generating profit. The greater
the profitability, the better the bank’s performance is. The efficiency dimension is measured using operational efficiency ratio (OER).
Operational efficiency ratio is derived from the
operational expense to the operational income.
The greater the OER, the less efficient the bank
is. The risk level dimension is measured by the
loan to deposit ratio (LDR), capital adequacy
ratio (CAR), equity to total assets (ETA), nonperforming loan - gross (NPL_G), and non-performing loan - net (NPL_N). The greater CAR
and ETA, the lower the risk, but the greater
LDR, NPL_G and NPL_N, the higher the risk.
NPL is the ratio of loans that are close to default
or actually defaulted to total loans. The greater
the NPL, the higher the risk.
The independent variable of the type of controlling owner is measured by using dummy
variable. This consists of the family-control
type (D_Fam), government-control type to
represent control by the government of the Republic of Indonesia (D_Gov), private-control
type to represent control by private institution
(D_Priv), and foreign-control type (D_Forg).
The type of a bank’s controlling interest is determined by which group has the largest control
of the bank, based on the largest percentage of
shares owned. The type of controlling ownership does not rely on just direct share ownership, but is determined by following each intermediate owner until the ultimate ownership.
For example, the largest shareholder of Bank
Victoria Syariah is Bank Victoria International,
possessing 99.98% of the Islamic bank, but the
ultimate shareholders of Bank Victoria Syariah are Susanna Tanoyo and Christien Tanoyo
(Bank Indonesia, 2012). They are indirect own77
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ers of Victoria Syariah Bank through Victoria
International Bank. The total direct and indirect
shares owned by Victoria International Bank
amounts to 48.22%. Therefore, Victoria Syariah Bank is categorized as a family controlled
bank.
The largest shareholder (99.99%) of Panin
Syariah Bank is Bank Panin, but the ultimate
owners of Bank Panin are Tijan Ananto & Muljadi Koesumo, Gunadi Gunawan, and Mu'min
Ali Gunawan (Bank Indonesia, 2012). They are
indirect owners of Bank Panin through PT Panin Finance Tbk., which holds 44.68% of Panin
Bank’s stocks. Moreover, the largest shareholders (99.99%) of bank BCA Syariah is Bank
Central Asia (BCA), but the bank’s ultimate
owners are Robert Budi Hartono and Bambang
Hartono (Bank Indonesia, 2012). As in the case
of Bank Panin, Robert Budi Hartono and Bambang Hartono are the indirect owners of BCA
through Farindo Investment (Mauritius) Ltd,
which hold 47.15% of the BCA’s stocks (Bank
Indonesia, 2012). Therefore, Panin Syariah
Bank and BCA Syariah as a bank is categorized
as a bank that is family owned and controlled.
Real earnings management as independent
variable is measured using the model of real
earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006;
Surifah, 2014) that is adjusted to the business
operations of the Islamic bank. On the other
hand, we use ownership concentration and size
of bank as our control variables. Ownership
Concentration is measured by the largest share
ownership, meanwhile the size is measured by
log total assets.
Before discussing the expropriation model
using real earnings management in Islamic
Banking, we will first discuss the model of the
real earnings management in the manufacturing
industry and conventional banks in the following section. This is pertinent because it relates
to the basic logic of the model’s formation.
Real Earnings Management–Manufacturing
Industry
Roychowdhury (2006) used a regression
model to measure the manipulation of real activities through cash flow from operating ac-
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tivities, production expenses, and discretionary
expenses. The regression model used was as
follows:
CFOt/At-1
= α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β1(St/At-1)
(1)
		 + β2(∆St/At-1) + єt
PRODt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β1(St/At-1)
		 + β2(∆St/At-1) + β3(∆St-1/At-1)
		 + єt
(2)
DISEXPt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β(St-1/At-1)
		 + єt
(3)
Note:
CFOit/Ait-1 : Cash flow from operations in the
year t, which is scaled with total
assets in year t-1.
α1(1/At-1) : The intercept scaled with total
assets in year t-1 thus operating
cash flow does not have value 0
when sales and lag sales value are
0.
Prodt/At-1 : Production costs in the year t
scaled with total assets in year t-1.
: Sales in the year t minus sales in
∆St/At-1
year t-1 scaled with total assets in
year t-1.
DisExpt/At-1 : Discretionary expenses in year t
scaled with total assets of bank i
in year t-1.
St/At-1
: Sales in year t scaled with total
assets in year t-1.
α0
: constant.
єt
: Error term in the year t.
The regression results in cash flow from normal operation, normal production cost, and normal discretionary expenses. The proxy of REM
are the abnormal cash flow of the operation
activities, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses. Therefore, the
observation of the abnormal cash flow of the
operation activities, abnormal production costs,
and abnormal discretionary expenses each year
are calculated by dividing the cash flow of the
actual operation activities, actual production
costs and actual discretionary expenses, with
total assets previous year minus the normal
cash flow of the operation activities, normal
production costs, and normal discretionary expenses. The normal cash flow of the operation
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activities, normal production costs, and normal
discretionary expenses are calculated by using
the estimation coefficient from the equations 1,
2, and 3.
The Real Earnings Management–Banking
Industry
Surifah (2014) created a model of real earnings management for banking industry that is
derived from Roychowdhury’s model (2006),
adjusted to the banking industry. The adjustment was done by: 1) replacing the sales income in manufacturing company with interest income. This is done because the primary
source of revenue in manufacturing industry is
sales while the primary source of revenue in the
banking industry is interest income. 2) Replacing the production costs with interest expenses.
The largest costs in the manufacturing industry
is costs of production, while the main expenses
in the banking industry is the interest expenses.
3) Replacing the discretionary expenses items
in manufacturing industry with the discretionary expenses items in banking industry.
Roychowdhury (2006) defines discretionary
expenses as the total amount of research and
development (R&D), advertisement, sales, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses. The
administration and general expenses were regarded as discretionary expenses, because it
often contained certain discretionary expenditure such as staff training, maintenance, travelling, etc. Surifah (2014) defines discretionary
expenses in the banking industry as the amount
of advertising, research and developments, administration and general expenses, the cost of
replacing production assets, and allowance for
doubtful accounts.
The real earnings management of the banking industry can be estimated by using the following three equations (Surifah, 2014):
CFOit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(IRit/Ait-1)
		 + β2(∆IRit/Ait-1) + єit
(4)
IEit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1)+ β1(IRit/Ait-1)
		 +β2(∆IRit/Ait-1) + β3(∆IRit-1/Ait-1)
		 + єit.
(5)
DEit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β(IRit-1/Ait-1)
(6)
		 + єit.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/2
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Note:
CFOit/Ait-1 : Cash flow from operations of bank
i, in year t, which is scaled with total
assets in year t-1.
α1(1/Ait-1) : Interception scaled with total assets
in year t-1, thus operating cash flow
does not have value 0 when interest
revenue and lag interest revenue
values are 0.
IRit/Ait-1 : Interest revenues of bank i, in year t
scaled with total assets in year t-1.
∆IRit/Ait-1 : Interest revenue of bank i, in year t
minus interest revenue of bank i in
year t-1 scaled with total assets in
year t-1.
IEit/At-1 : Interest expenses of bank i in year t
scaled with total assets of bank i in
year t-1.
DEit/Ait-1 : Discretionary expenses of bank i
in year t scaled with total assets of
bank i in year t-1.
α0
: constant.
єit
: Error term of bank i in year t.
The regression estimated by equations 4, 5,
and 6 was done inter-company (cross-sectional)
per year, as done by Roychowdhury (2006) and
(Zang, 2012). The abnormal values of CFO,
IE, and DE are left as is instead of transformed
into their absolute values, because the positive
and negative values have different meanings.
Abnormal interest expenses and positive discretionary expenses meant that the interest expenses and discretionary expenses of the bank
are higher than the industry’s average. This
indicates that the bank is less efficient. On the
contrary, abnormal positive cash flow indicates
that the bank has a higher cash flow compared to
the industry’s average. Several previous studies
that tested the real earnings management also
choose to not turn the variables into their absolute values (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Gunny
2010; Hashemi & Rabiee, 2011; Roychowdhury, 2006; Surifah, 2014).
The regression results in cash flow from normal operation, normal interest expenses, and
normal discretionary expenses. The proxies of
REM are the abnormal cash flow of the operation activities, abnormal interest expenses, and
79
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abnormal discretionary expenses. Therefore,
the observation of the abnormal cash flow of
the operation activities, abnormal interest expenses, and abnormal discretionary expenses
each year are calculated by dividing the cash
flow of the actual operation activities, actual
interest expenses, and actual discretionary expenses, with total assets previous year minus
the normal cash flow of the operation activities,
normal interest expenses, and normal discretionary expenses. The normal cash flow of the
operation activities, normal interest expenses
and regular discretionary expenses are calculated by using the estimation coefficient from
equations 4, 5, and 6 (Surifah, 2014).
In the other words, the abnormal CFO, IE,
and DE are the actual CFO, IE, and DE after being deducted by the normal CFO, IE, and DE.
Because normal CFO, IE, and DE could not be
observed directly, they were estimated using
the regression of the actual CFO, IE, and DE
towards the independent variable in the equations 4, 5, and 6. Thus the abnormal CFO, IE,
and DE were the error terms of those equations.
The abnormal CFO, IE, and DE were the proxy
of the real earnings management (REM) (Surifah, 2014).
With the model of the real earnings management of banking as above, Surifah (2014) is
able to show strong indication of expropriation
of family-type controlling shareholders, using
real earnings management that may decrease
the bank’s financial performance. The real earnings management in banks controlled by family
and private institution are significantly different
and higher than banks controlled by government
and foreign investors. Does the Islamic banking
industry also display similar expropriation risk
from the family owner-controller? This study
began to answer the question.
The Real Earnings Management – Islamic
Bank
Before discussing the real earnings management in Islamic banks, we will first discuss the
main operating revenue and expenses in Islamic Banking (Bank Indonesia, 2006-2012). The
main operational incomes of an Islamic bank
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consists of incomes from the fund disbursement
and incomes from other operating sources. The
incomes from fund disbursement consist of
various investment and loans to non-bank third
parties, income from sharia-compliant securities of Bank Indonesia and other banks in Indonesia. While incomes from non-bank third
party consist of murabahah margin income,
parallel salam net income, parallel istishna net
income, ijarah leased income, mudharabah
revenue sharing income, musyarakah revenue
sharing income, and income from equity participation. In addition, incomes from Bank Indonesia consist of Bank Indonesia wadiah certificate (SWBI) bonuses and others. Moreover,
incomes from other banks in Indonesia consist
of bonuses from other Islamic bank, mudharabah revenue sharing income, and others. Lastly,
other operating incomes consist of mudharabah muqayyadah, service fee, foreign exchange
transaction income, loss allowances for earning
assets (PPAP), and miscellaneous others.
The primary operating expense of the Islamic banking industry consists of the share of
revenue for investors of unrestricted investment
fund. This consists of mudharabah savings account, mudharabah time deposits, sharia short
term funding facility, mudharabah interbank
investment certificate, and others. The discretionary expenses of the Islamic banking industry consist of expense of provision for asset of
possible losses, expense for estimated losses of
commitment and contingencies, general and administration expense, and promotion expense.
Based on the incomes and revenue share distributed to investor of unrestricted investment
fund and discretionary expenses, the real earnings management model for Islamic Bank can
be made as follows:
CFOit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(ORit/Ait-1)
		 + β2(∆ORit/Ait-1) + єit
(7)
RSDit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1)+ β1(ORit/Ait-1)
		 +β2(∆ORit/Ait-1) + β3(∆ORit-1/Ait-1)
		 + єit.
(8)
DEit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β(ORit-1/Ait-1)
		 + єit. .
(9)
Note:
CFOit/Ait-1 : Cash flow from operations of bank
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α1(1/Ait-1) :

ORit/Ait-1 :
∆ORit/Ait-1

RSDit/At-1 :

BDit/Ait-1 :
α0
єit

:
:

i, in the year t, which are scaled
with total assets in the year t-1.
Interception scaled with total assets
of bank i, in the year t-1 thus
operating cash flow does not have
value 0 when operating revenue
and lag operating revenue value are
0.
Operating revenue of bank i, in the
year t, which are scaled with total
assets in the year t-1.
: Operating revenue of bank i, in
the year t, minus operating revenue
of bank i in the year t-1 scaled with
total assets in year t-1.
Revenue sharing distributed for
investor of unrestricted investment
fund of bank i, in the year t, which
is scaled with total assets in the year
t-1.
Discretionary expenses of bank i,
in the year t, which are scaled with
total assets in the year t-1.
constant.
error term of bank i, in the year t.

This model of the real earnings management
is derived from the real earnings management
model in Roychowdhury (2006) and Surifah
(2014), adjusted for the Islamic banking industry. The adjustment on Roychowdhury model
(2006) is done by replacing the sale items
with the operation expenses, the production
cost items using revenue sharing distributed
(RSD). Besides, the discretionary expenses in
Roychowdhury model (2006) consist of R&D
expenses, advertisement, administration and
general expenses, meanwhile the discretionary
expenses in this study consist of the expenses
for provision for asset of possible losses, estimated losses of commitment and contingencies, general purpose and administration, and
promotion.
There are only few Islamic Banks in Indonesia, therefore the regression estimation in the
equation 7, 8, and 9 is used for all the firms in
all the observation years. The abnormal values
in CFO, operating revenue (OR), and revenue
sharing distributed (RSD) are not transformed
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into their absolute value like done by Cohen et
al. (2008), Gunny (2010), Hashemi and Rabiee
(2011), and Roychowdhury (2006).
Cash flow from normal operation normal
production cost, and normal discretionary expenses are generated from the regression results. The proxies for REM are the abnormal
cash flow of the operation activities, abnormal
revenue sharing distributed, and abnormal discretionary expenses. Therefore, the observation of the abnormal cash flow of the operation
activities, distributed abnormal revenue share,
and abnormal discretionary expenses each year
are calculated by dividing the cash flow of the
actual operation activities, actual revenue sharing distributed, and actual discretionary expenses, with total assets previous year minus
the normal cash flow of the operation activities,
normal revenue sharing distributed expenses,
and normal discretionary expenses. The normal
cash flow of the operation activities, normal
revenue sharing distributed expenses, and normal discretionary expenses are calculated by
using the estimation coefficient from equations
7, 8, and 9.
In other words, the abnormal CFO, RSD,
and DE are the actual CFO, RSD, and DE, deducted by the normal CFO, RSD, and DE. Because the normal CFO, RSD, and DE could not
be observed directly, so they are estimated using the actual CFO, RSD, and DE regression to
the independent variable in equations 7, 8, and
9. Thus the abnormal CFO, RSD, and DE are
the error terms from those three equations. The
abnormal CFO, RSD, and DE are the proxies of
real earnings management (REM).
Analysis Technique and Research Equation
Model
The Mann-Whitney test is used to test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. This technique can
be used to observe the difference of two independent data categories from similar population
(Siegen & Castellan, 1988). The test is one of
the most powerful of the nonparametric tests,
and a very useful alternative to the parametric
t test when the researcher wishes to avoid the
t test’s assumptions or when the measurement
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Type of Control and Ownership Percentage
Type of Controllers

N
16
22
18
5
61

Family
Governance
Institution
Foreign
Total N

(%)
26
36
30
8
100

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Financial Ratios, Size, and Ownership Concentration
Financial Ratios
Return on assets
Return on equity
Net interest margin
Operating efficiency ratio
Capital adequacy ratio
Loan deposits ratio
Non-performing loan net
Non-performing loan gross
Assets /size (billion – IDR)
Ownership Concentration (largest)

N
61
61
61
61
61
61
61
61
61
61

Min.
-0.059
-0.190
-0.009
0.347
0.106
0.066
0.000
0.000
161,649
0.28

Max.
0.069
0.681
0.155
6.077
5.086
2.986
1.083
3.900
124,754
1.00

Mean.
0.014
0.163
0.066
0.984
0.442
0.686
0.068
0.087
12,581
0.86

Std. Dev.
0.018
0.203
0.032
0.729
0.811
0.610
0.222
0.497
20,820
0.25

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Real Earnings Management (REM)
The Type of REM
REM_RSD
REM_DE
REM_CFO

N
61
61
61

Min
-0.044
-0.305
-0.036

Max
0.068
0.955
0.107

Std. Dev.
0.022
0.144
0.022

Note:
• REM is calculated by dividing all numerator in the above equations (equation 1 to 9) with total asset of previous year. Therefore the number
of REM is small.
• REM_RSD: real earnings management through revenues sharing distribution, REM_DE: real earnings management through discretionary
expenses; REM_CFO: real earnings management through cash flow from operation.

used in the study is weaker than interval scaling
(Siegel & Castellan, 1988).
Furthermore, we use ordinary least square
multiple regression to test hypotheses 3. This
technique is commonly used for testing the impact of independent variable on dependent variable. Equation Model is used to test hypothesis
3 are:
Profitability = α + β1REM_RSD + β2REM_DE
		 + β3REM_CFO + β4OwnConc 		
+ β5Size
(10)
Efficiency = α + β1REM_RSD + β2REM_DE
		 + β3REM_CFO + β4OwnConc 		
+ β5 Size
(11)
Risk
= α + β1REM_RSD + β2REM_DE
		 + β3REM_CFO + β4OwnConc
		 + β5 Size
(12)
Note: REM_RSD: real earnings management
through revenues sharing distribution; REM_
DE: real earnings management through discretionary expenses; REM_CFO: real earnings
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management through cash flow from operation;
OwnConc: ownership concentration; size: size
of bank.

Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2, 3, and 4 are descriptive statistics of
data and variables we use in this study. Table 2
indicates that the Government controls 36% of
the Islamic Banks in Indonesia. Private institutions and Family control 30% and 26% of the
Banks successively, while foreign institutions
only control 8% of them.
Table 3 shows that almost all Islamic banks
are controlled by the controller owners, and all
of their shares are held by large factions instead
in the diffused manner by the general public.
The average ownership concentration (OwnCon) is 86%, and this shows that the Islamic
banking industry is very concentrated. This is
in line with the previous studies which shows
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that most Indonesian companies are very concentrated (Prabowo 2010; Sanjaya 2010; Surifah 2014). This result is differ from that of the
spreading ownership in US and UK.
Table 4 shows that maximal REM_DE is
0.995 and minimal -0.305. It show that the distance between maximal REM_DE and minimal
REM_DE the bigger than the distance between
maximal and minimal REM_RSD and REM_
CFO. It means that REM_DE more likely to
be conceal expropriation than REM_CFO and
REM_DE.
Result of H1 test: the Difference of Real
Earnings Management among the Various
Controller Types
Result on H1 testing shows that real earnings management through revenues sharing
distribution, discretionary expense, and cash
flow from operation are significantly different
among the various bank controller types. The
result means that there is a difference of the real
earnings management among various controller
types. This result is in line with some previous
studies that show that controller shareholders
are related to earnings management (Atmaja et
al., 2011; Ding et al., 2007; Haw et al., 2011;
Jiraporn and Dadalt, 2009; Sanjaya, 2011; Siregar & Utama, 2008; Tong, 2008).
The ownership categories with the highest
scores in real earnings management (REM)
through revenues sharing distribution, ordered
from the highest to the lowest, are government
controlled banks, private institution controlled
banks, family controlled banks, and foreign
controlled banks. The ownership categories
with the highest scores in REM through discretionary expense, ordered from the highest to the
lowest, are government controlled banks, followed by foreign institution controlled banks,
private institution controlled banks, and family controlled banks. The ownership categories
with the highest scores of REM through cash
flow from operation, ordered from the highest
to the lowest, are foreign controlled banks, government controlled banks, private institution
controlled banks, and family controlled banks.
Real earnings management through reve-

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/2
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v7i2.5137

nues sharing distribution and discretionary expense show that expenses deviate from normal
operational practices, thus the higher the real
earnings management through revenues sharing distribution and discretionary expense, the
less efficient it would be. On the contrary, real
earnings management through cash flow from
operations shows great deviation in the cash
flow, so the higher the real earning management
through cash flow from operation, the better.
The result indicates that Islamic banks controlled by the Indonesian government have the
highest revenues sharing distribution and discretionary expense. On the contrary, the banks
controlled by foreign investors have the lowest
revenues sharing distribution for investors expense, but have the highest operating cash flow.
Based on this result, it can be concluded that
the foreign banks are the best in earnings management. The family-controlled banks have
the lowest real earnings management through
discretionary expense and cash flow from operation. This means the discretionary expenses
and revenues sharing distribution for investors
expenses of the family bank are relatively low
compared to the other banks. The family-controlled banks also have the smallest operating
cash flow compared to the other banks. The
banks controlled by private institution has the
second highest score in real earning management through revenues sharing distribution,
third rank score in real earnings management
through discretionary expense, and third rank
score in real earning management through cash
flow from operation. This result shows that the
private institution controlled banks have the
earnings management in the middle position
among the other banks.
This study uses the various dimensions of the
real earnings management, so it is difficult to
determine which is the highest controller types
who do opportunistic earnings management.
Therefore, scoring needs to be done, so the
controller types with the highest real earnings
management score can be determined. Scoring
is done by giving the score 4 for the controller
types with the highest real earning management
through revenues sharing distribution and discretionary expense, respectively score 3, 2, and
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Table 5. The Test Result of Man Whitney U, the Differences of Real Earnings Management
among the Various Bank Controller Types
REM
REM_RSD

REM_DE

REM_CFO

Controller Types
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.

N
Mean Rank
16
25.63
22
38.45
18
30.39
5
17.60
16
18.94
22
42.18
18
27.39
5
33.40
16
22.69
22
37.41
18
28.50
5
38.40
Sum of REM score:

Sign.
0.039

0.001

0.052

REM Numb
3
1
2
4
4
1
3
2
1
3
2
4

Score
2
4
3
1
1
4
2
3
4
2
3
1

Fam
2

Gov

Priv

Forg

4
3
1
1
4
2
3
4
2
3
7

10

8

1
5

Note: REM: Real earnings management. Fam: Family control; Gov: Government control, Priv: Private institutions control, Forg: Foreigners
control. REM_RSD: real earning management from revenues sharing distribution; REM_DE: real earnings management form discretionary
expense; REM_CFO: real earnings management through cash flow from operation.

1 for the lowest. On the contrary, the researcher
will give score 4 for the lowest real earning
management through cash flow from operation
score of the controller types, and respectively
score 3, 2, and 1 for the highest real earning
management through cash flow from operation.
Table 5 shows the differences of real earnings management among the various bank controller types. Based on the scores of the various real earning management dimensions, we
can conclude that the highest score of the real
earnings management is achieved by the banks
controlled by Indonesia government, while the
lowest is achieved by the banks controlled by
foreigners. Real earning management bank
controlled by family is not significantly different from the bank controlled by government.
Why do government controlled Islamic
banks seem to be the highest expropriator
through real earnings management? Technically, the owners of a government-owned bank
are the populace. The populaces like in the
spreading share ownership are the powerless
party because person per person cannot control
the company. The management party, direction,
and the commissioner board can expropriate,
such as by determining the high salaries, bonuses, and fund distribution facility to the family or
persons in their group. There had been the regulation of the maximum limit of the credit giving
to the related party (Bank Indonesia, 2005), but
did not regulate in detail until to what degree of
blood relative relation or relation by marriage,
84
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might also be political relation. On the contrary,
the banks controlled by foreigners have the low
real earnings management score; it might be because the tighter professionalism demand, better corporate governance, sophisticated technology, and better mechanism control. This result
is in line with the previous studies that showed
that Controllers type is associated with incentive to expropriation (Fayoumi, Abuzayed, &
Alexander, 2010; Palenzuela & Mariscal, 2007)
and it would be associated with higher misuse
of reporting discretion and lower earnings informativeness (Fan & Wong, 2002). The controller types are significant and positively affect
earnings management (Fayoumi et al., 2010).
Result of H2 test: the Performance Difference
among the Various Controller Types of
Islamic Bank
This study uses the various dimensions of
the performance, so it is difficult to determine
which is the highest controller types who have
performance. Therefore, scoring needs to be
done, so the controller types with the highest
performance score can be determined.
Scoring is done by giving the score 4 for the
controller types with the highest ROA, ROE,
NIM, CAR, and ETA, respectively score 3, 2,
and 1 for the lowest. On the contrary, the researcher will give score 4 for the lowest OER,
LDR, NPLG, and NPLN score of the controller
types, and respectively score 3, 2, and 1 for the
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Table 6. The Test Result of Man Whitney U; the Difference of Performance among the
Various Bank Controller Types and the Scoring
Perf.
Controller Types
Profitability Dimension:
ROA
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
ROE
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
NIM
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
Efficiency Dimension:
OER
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
Risk Dimension:
CAR
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
LDR
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
ETA
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
NPLG
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.
NPLN
Fam
Gov.
Priv
Forg.

N

Mean Rank

Sign.

16
22
18
5
16
22
18
5
16
22
18
5

24.69
27.16
35.86
50.6
19.31
32.09
41.22
26.8
23.25
37.05
32.44
24

0.015

16
22
18
5

16
22
18
5
16
22
18
5
16
22
18
5
16
22
18
5
16
22
18
5

36.56
31.86
30.83
10

45.88
27.91
17.06
47.2
34.31
36.05
20.5
36
47.31
25.64
19.11
45.2
17.19
41.8
31.39
26.3
20.28
34.68
39.28
19.3

0.004

0.09

0.035

0

Numb of Perf.

Scor

4
1
3
2
2
3
1
4
4
1
2
3
1
4
3
2
4
1
1
4
2
3
3
2
Sum of Profitability Score:
4
1
3
2
2
3
1
4
Sum of Efficiency Score:

2
3
3
2
4
1
1
4
0.029
2
3
4
1
1
4
3
2
0
1
4
3
2
4
1
2
3
0
1
4
4
1
3
2
2
3
0.005
2
3
3
2
4
1
1
4
Sum of Risk Score
Sum of Performance Score:

Fam

Gov

Priv

Forg

1
2
3
4
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
3

8

10

2
9

1
2
3
1

2

3

4
4

3
2
1
4
3
1
4
2
4
2
1
3
4
1
2
3
3
2
1
17
21

8
18

9
22

4
16
29

Note: Perf: performance. N: number of samples. Fam: Family control; Gov: Government control, Priv: Private institutions control, Forg:
Foreigners control. ROA: return on assets. ROE: return on equity. NIM: net interest margin. OER: operational efficiency ratio. CAR: capital
adequacy ratio. LDR: loan deposit ratio. ETA: equity to total assets. NPLG: non performing loan_gross. NPLN: non performing loan_net.

highest OER, LDR, NPLG, and NPLN.
Table 6 indicates that the highest score of
profitability respectively is private institution
controlled banks, followed by foreign controlled banks, government controlled banks,
and family controlled banks. The highest score
of efficiency respectively is foreign controlled
banks, followed by private institution controlled banks, government controlled banks,
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/2
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and family controlled banks. The highest score
of risk respectively is family controlled banks,
followed by foreign controlled banks, private
institution controlled banks, and government
controlled banks.
Based on the score value of the various performance dimensions, it can be concluded that
that the bank with the highest performance is the
bank controlled by foreigners. On the contrary
85
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Table 7. The Test Result of The effect of Real Earnings Management on Profitability
Variable
Constant)
REM_RSD
REM_DE
REM_CFO
OwnCon
Lg_Assets
F value
Significancy
R2
Adjusted R2
N

Exp. Sign.
+

Regression Coef.
-10.551
0.140
-2.064
12.202
0.875
0.773

t values
-4.411
0.027
-2.775
2.191
1.816
4.440

Sig.
0.000***
0.979
0.008***
0.033**
0.075***
0.000***

7.121
0.000
0.393
0.338
60

Note:*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. REM_RSD: real earnings management from revenues
sharing distribution; REM_DE: real earnings management through discretionary expense; REM_CFO: real earnings management through
cash flow from operation. OwnCon: ownership concentration. Lg_assets: log of total assets.

the bank with the lowest performance score is
the bank controlled by Indonesian Government.
The score difference between Indonesian Government Bank and foreign banks is very high,
meanwhile the score difference between the
family banks and private institutions banks is
very low. This study result is in line with the
previous study, which found that there was the
performance difference among the different
controller shareholders (Achmad et al., 2009).
This result indicates that there is expropriation risk through the real earnings management
related with the banks’ low performance. This
study result is in line with the previous study
which found that the high expropriation risks
was related to the low performance and firm
value (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La
Porta, et al., 2002; Zhu & Ma 2009).
Result of H3 test: the Effect of the Real
Earnings Management on Performance
Hypothesis 3 tests the effect of the real
earnings management on performance, which
is measured by the various financial ratios.
Therefore the factor analysis needs to be done
to summarize or reduce the variables. The factor analysis results become 3 variables that are
named profitability (profit), efficiency, and risk.
Profitability variable comes from the variables
ROA, ROE and NIM. The efficiency variable
comes from OER, meanwhile the risk variable
comes from NPLG. Not all variables can be
summarized.
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The Effect of the Real Earnings Management
on Profitability
Table 7 shows that the real earnings management through RSD expenses does not affect
the profitability level. This result is not in accordance with the prediction. The real earnings
management through the discretionary expenses influences negatively and significantly the
profitability. This result means that the higher
the earnings management through discretionary expenses, the lower the profitability level of
Islamic bank. This result is in accordance with
the prediction.
The earnings management through the operation cash flow influences positively the
profitability. It means that the higher the departures from normal operational practices of the
positive operation cash flow are, the lower the
banks’ profitability level. The operation cash
flow is the main source of the banks’ operational, so the greater the cash flow of the banks’ operation is, the business opportunities catching
will be more free, and the greater the fund that
can be distributed to the customers is, therefore
the greater the profitability is. This result is also
in accordance with the prediction.
Why didn’t real earning management
through revenues sharing distribution (RSD)
expenses influence the profitability? It might be
because the greatness of RSD expenses in the
certain range was relatively determined by government, so the management party or the controller owners were difficult in taking the pri-
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Table 8. The Test Result of The effect of Real Earnings Management on Efficiency
Variable
(Constant)
REM_RSD
REM_DE
REM_CFO
OwnCon
Lg_Aset
F value
Sign.
R2
Adjusted R2
N

Exp. Sign.
+
+
-

Regression Coef.
9.691
8.733
11.808
-1.049
-0.536
-0.655

t-value
6.219
2.451
22.608
-0.293
-1.632
-5.771

Sig
0.000***
0.018**
0.000***
0.770
0.109
0.000***

110.56
0.000
0.914
0.906
59

Note:*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. REM_RSD: real earnings management from revenues
sharing distribution; REM_DE: real earnings management through discretionary expense; REM_CFO: real earnings management through
cash flow from operation. OwnCon: ownership concentration. Lg_assets: log of total assets.

Table 9. The Test Result of The effect of Real Earnings Management on Risk
Variable
C
REM_RSD
REM_DE
REM_CFO
OwnCon
Lg_Aset
F value
Sign.
R2
Adjusted R2
N

Exp. Sign.
+
+
_

Regression Coef.
-0.080
0.019
0.063
0.081
-0.006
0.009

t-value
-2.053
0.221
5.255
0.905
-0.799
3.042

Sig.
0.045
0.826
0.000***
0.370
0.428
0.004***

8.351
0.000
0.436
0.384
60

Note:*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. REM_RSD: real earnings management from revenues
sharing distribution; REM_DE: real earnings management through discretionary expense; REM_CFO: real earnings management through
cash flow from operation. OwnCon: ownership concentration. Lg_assets: log of total assets.

vate benefits through real earning management
from revenues sharing distribution. Therefore,
real earning management the expenses of revenues sharing distribution does not influence
the performance.
The Influence of the Real Earnings Management
toward Efficiency
Table 8 shows that the earnings management
through the revenues sharing distribution and
discretionary expenses influences positively the
efficiency, in accordance with the prediction.
This result means that the greater real earning
management from revenues sharing distribution and real earning management from discretionary expenses are, the greater OER (the
operational cost per operational income) is or
less efficient. REM through the operation cash
flow does not influence efficiency. The control
variable of ownership concentration does not

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/2
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influence efficiency; meanwhile the company
size influences negatively the efficiency. This
result means that the greater Islamic Bank is, it
will be more efficient.
The Effect of the Real Earnings Management
On the Risk Level
Table 9 shows that the earnings management through discretionary expenses influences
the risk level positively. This result is in accordance with the prediction. It means that the
greater real earnings management from revenues sharing distribution, the higher NPLG or
it is riskier. Real earnings management from
revenues sharing distribution and real earnings
management through cash flow from operation
do not influence the risk level.
The control variable of ownership concentration does not influence the risk level, mean
while the size of Islamic bank influences the
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risk positively. This result means that the greater the bank size is, the greater NPLG is, so it
will be riskier.
Based on the table 7 through 9, it can be
concluded that the REM negatively affect the
performance of Islamic banks in Indonesia. The
REM through discretionary expenses negatively affect profitability. The earnings management
through the expenses of revenues sharing distribution and discretionary expenses positively affect the OER (operational cost per operational
income) is or it can be stated that it operates less
efficient. The earnings management through
discretionary expenses positively influences
the risk level. These results are in line with previous study which states that when companies
change the timing and structure of real business
transactions, they deviate from normal operating practices, optimal planning and disturb the
real cost of the company (Ewert & Wagenhofer,
2005). The manager will manipulate real activities to meet the earnings targets, even though it
will lower the company value in the long term
(Graham et al., 2005). Manipulation operating
activities such as R&D, production, and capital investment leads to deviation from normal
business practices and potentially degrade the
performance in subsequent years. Manipulation
of real activity can reduce the long-term profitability (Roychowdhury, 2006).

Conclusion
This study provides evidence that the earnings management model based on the real activities of an Islamic bank can be used to detect expropriation by controller owners. This
is supported by empirical evidence, where the
banks coring high in real earnings management
has among the lowest performance score. The
opposite is also true; the bank with the lowest
score of the real earnings management has the
highest performance.
This study finds evidence that there are differences of REM and performance in the various types of banks’ controllers. Islamic Bank
controlled by Indonesian Government has
the highest REM score and the lowest performance. On the contrary, the banks controlled
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by foreigners have the lowest REM score and
the highest performance score. This result indicates that there is expropriation risk through the
real earnings management related with the low
Islamic Bank performance. REM and banks’
performance controlled by family are not significantly different from the private institutions.
This study also finds that the real earnings
management through discretionary expenses
influences negatively and significantly the profitability. The higher the earnings management
through discretionary expenses, the lower the
profitability level of Islamic bank. The earnings
management through the operation cash flow
influences positively the profitability. It means
the higher the earnings management through
the operation cash flow, the higher the banks’
profitability. The earnings management through
the revenues sharing distributed expenses and
discretionary expenses influences positively
the efficiency. This result means that the greater
the earnings management through the revenues
sharing distributed expenses and discretionary expenses is, the greater the operational
expenses per operational income are or less efficient. The earnings management through discretionary expenses influences positively the
risk level. It means that the greater the earnings
management through discretionary expenses is,
the higher the non performing loan, thus it is
riskier.
This study result can be applied by practitioners to detect the expropriation indication
in Islamic Bank. Expropriation indication can
be seen from the real earnings management
through the expenses of the revenues sharing
distributed, discretionary expenses, and operation cash flow. Based on the study findings the
researchers recommended to policy makers to
restrict REM and specify the rules and guidelines about corporate governance for Islamic
banking.
Limitations of this study are 1) sample size
is rather small, because the number of Islamic
banks in Indonesia is still limited. Therefore,
further study could include more data, for example: bank in Asia regional level or in world
level. 2) This study only examine the expropriation indications of Islamic bank through
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REM, further study can examine the expropriation indication in the Islamic bank through
discretionary accruals or loan loss provision. 3)
This study combines various types of revenue
in Islamic banks such as murabahah margin
income, parallel salam net income, and istishna’ income into the one name of the operating
revenue. Therefore, further study could test the
REM on each item of income and expenses.
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